Definitions and Descriptions of Analysis

The older a word, the deeper it reaches. (Wittgenstein NB, 40) §6.5

This supplement collects together assorted meanings and also descriptions of evaluation that have actually been offered in the history of ideology (including all the classical ones), to show the selection ofvarious conceptions and also the concerns that aclimb. (There are likewise someremarks on related topics such as analyticity, interpretation, and methodology more mostly.) In most cases, abbreviated recommendations are given; complete details have the right to be found in the Annotated Bibliography onAnalysis, in the section mentioned in curly brackets after the pertinent interpretation or summary. Wbelow tright here is more than one passage quoted from a details writer, passages are numbered in chronological order of composition (as much as that have the right to be determined).

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1. Definitions of Analysis 2. Descriptions of Analysis

1. Definitions of Analysis

Cambridge Thesaurus of Philosophy, 2nd ed., 1999, ed. Robert Audithe procedure of breaking up a concept, proplace, linguistic facility, or reality right into its easy or ultimate constituents. §1.1Concise Oxford Dictionary, 1976, ed. J. B. Sykes1. Resolution right into simpler aspects by analysing (opp.synthesis); statement of result of this; … 2. (Math.)Use of algebra and also calculus in problem-fixing. §1.1Thesaurus of Philosophy and Psychology, 1925, ed. James Mark Baldwin, Vol. IThe isolation of what is even more elementary from what is even more complicated by whatever before method. §1.1A Kant Dictionary, 1995, by Howard CaygillKant combines 2 senses of analysis in his occupational, oneobtained from Greek geomeattempt, the other from contemporary physics andchemisattempt. Both remain cshed to the original Greek feeling of analysisas a ‘loosening up’ or ‘releasing’, but eachcontinue in different ways. The previous proceeds‘lemmatically’ by assuming a proplace to be true andlooking for one more known truth from which the proplace might bededuced. The latter proceeds by resolving complex wholes into their elements. §4.5Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, 1996, by Simon BlackburnThe procedure of breaking a principle dvery own right into more basic components,so that its logical structure is shown. §1.1Philosophielexikon, 1997, ed. A. Hügli and also P. LübckeAuflösung, Zerlegung in Bestandteile, im Gegensatz zuSynthese. §1.1Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 1998, entry under ‘Analytical Philosophy’ by Thomas BaldwinPhilosophical evaluation is an approach of inquiry in which one seeksto assess facility units of believed by ‘analysing’ them into simpler aspects whose relationships are thereby carried intoemphasis. §1.1Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 1998, entry under ‘Conceptual Analysis’ by Robert HannaThe concept of conceptual analysis holds that concepts– general meanings of linguistic predicates – are thefundamental objects of philosophical inquiry, and that insights intoconceptual contents are expressed in crucial ‘conceptualtruths’ (analytic propositions). §1.1

Annotated Bibliography, §1.1

2. Descriptions of Analysis

Alexander of AphrodisiasAristotleArnauld, Antoine and Nicole, PierreAyer, A. J.Bentham, JeremyBergboy, HenriBabsence, MaxBos, Henk J. M.Bradley, F. H.

I would rather now lay even more stress on the logical vice of all Analysisand also Abstractivity – so far as that means taking any type of attribute in theWhole of Things as ultimately actual other than in its union through theWhole. (Collected Works of F.H. Bradley: Selected Correspondence1905-1924, Bristol, Thoemmes Press, 1999, 275)

Analysis and synthesis I take in the end to be two facets ofone principle … Eincredibly evaluation proceeds from and on the basisof a unity ... The allude before us is the question regarding just how, withoutseparation in its visibility, we deserve to discriminate ideally inanalysis. (ETR, 300)

Brandom, Robert B.Carnap, RudolfCassirer, ErnstCohen, L. JonathanCollinglumber, R. G.Davidboy, Donald

In viewpoint we are provided to definitions, analyses,reductions. Typically these are intfinished to lug us from conceptsbetter taken, or clear, or even more basic epistemologically orontologically, to others we want to understand. The approach I havesuggested fits namong these categories. I have actually proposed a looserrelation between principles to be illuminated and also the fairly morefundamental. (‘Radical Interpretation’, 1972, Inquiries intoTruth and Interpretation, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001,137)

De Chardin, Teilhard

Unchoose the primitives who provided a face to eincredibly relocating point, or the beforehand Greeks who defined all the elements and forces of nature, modernguy is obsessed by the should depersonalise (or impersonalise) all that he many admires. Tright here are 2 reasons for this tendency. The first is analysis, that marvellous instrument of clinical research study to which we owe all our developments yet which, breaking down synthesis after synthesis, permits one spirit after another to escape, leaving us faced via a pile of dismantled machinery, and also evanescent pshort articles. The second factor lies in the discovery of the sideactual people, so large that it appears to do amethod via all proportion between our own being and also the dimensions of the cosmos around us. (The Phenomenon of Man, 1955, 282; tr. Bernard Wall, Fontana, 1965; tr. initially publ. 1959)

Derrida, Jacques

Up until currently the idea of ideology continued to be identified in a formal wayas an concept of an limitless job theoria. Could a history ofthis infinite theoretical life, which merges itself in its efforts andfailures via an easy realization of the self, take on thevalue of a genetic description? Will the background of the“transcendental motive” with all the steras of Europeanphilosophy, enlighten us at last on the genesis of transcendentalsubjectivity? But such a background presupposes the possibility of such agoing backward, the opportunity of finding again the originary senseof the former presents as such. It suggests the possibility of atranscendental “regression” (Ruckfrage) with abackground that is intelligible and also transparent to consciousness, abackground whose sedimentations have the right to be unmade and remade withoutchange. (The Problem of Genesis in Husserl"s Philosophy,The College of Chicearlier Press, 2003, 161; tr. MarianHobson)

Descartes, RenéEuclidFrege, GottlobGeertz, Clifford

Analysis … is sorting out the structures of signification … and also determining their social ground and import. (The Interpretation of Cultures, New York: Basic Books, 1973, 9)

Cultural analysis is (or need to be) guessing at interpretations, assessing the guesses, and also drawing explanatory conclusions from the better guesses, not discovering the Continent of Meaning and mapping out itsbodiless landscape. (Ibid., 20)

Hegel, Georg W.F.Heidegger, MartinHobbes, ThomasHodges, Wilfrid

stands somewbelow in between translating and also paraphrasing. (Logic, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1977, 86)

Holton, GeraldHusserl, EdmundKant, ImmanuelLakatos, ImreLeibniz, Gottfried WilhelmLichtenberg, Georg ChristophLocke, JohnLodge, David

Analysis has a way of unravelling the self: the longer you pull on the thcheck out, the more fregulations you uncover. (Therapy, London, 31)

Mendelssohn, MosesMoore, G. E.Newton, IsaacNietzsche, Friedrich

All principles in which an entire process is semiotically telescoped elude definition. (On the Genealogy of Morals, 1887, tr. Wchange Kaufmann, New York: Random Housage, 1968, 80)

the most useful insights are methods. (The Antichrist, 1895, §13)


For we must remember that if a person goes on analyzing names intowords, and also inquiring additionally into the aspects out of which the words areformed, and also keeps on always repeating this process, he that has toanswer him must at last offer up the inquiry in despair … But ifwe take a word which is inqualified of even more resolution, then we shallbe appropriate in saying that we at last reached a main aspect, whichrequire not be refixed any even more. (‘Cratylus’, BenjaminJowett (trans.), in Hamilton and Cairns (ed.), CollectedDialogues, New York: Pantheon Books, 421e)

Then, shelp I, is not dialectic the only procedure of inquiry thatadvancements in this manner, doing amethod through hypotheses, up to the firstprinciple itself in order to find confirmation there? And it isliterally true that as soon as the eye of the soul is sunk in the barbaricslough of the Orphic Myth, dialectic gently draws it forth and also leadsit up, employing as helpers and cooperators in this conversation thestudies and sciences which we enumerated, which we dubbed sciencesfrequently from halittle bit, though they really require some other designation,connoting more clearness than opinion and even more obscurity thanscience. ‘Understanding’ I think was the term weemployed. But, I presume we shall not dispute about the name whenpoints of such minute lie prior to us forconsideration. (‘Republic VII’, Paul Shorey (trans.),Ibid., 533d)

Understand then, shelp I, that by the various other area of the intelligibleI intend that which the factor lays hold of by the power of dialectic,treating its assumptions not as absolute beginnings yet literally ashypotheses, underpinnings, footings and also springboards so to speak, topermit it to increase to that which calls for no assumption and also is thebeginning allude of all, and after attaining to that again taking holdof the first dependencies from it, so to proceed downward to theconclusion, making no use whatever of any object of sense however only ofpure principles moving on through ideregarding principles and finishing withideas. (‘Republic VI’, Paul Shorey (trans.),Ibid., 511b)

Poincaré, Jules Henri

In mathematics logic is referred to as analysis, and also analysis implies division, dissection. It deserve to have actually, therefore, no tool other than the scalpel and also the microscopic lense. (‘Intuition andLogic in Mathematics’, 1900, in William Ewald, ed., From Kant to Hilbert, Oxford: Oxford College Press, 1996, 1018)

Polya, GeorgeProclusQuine, W.V.O.Rorty, Richard

The issue is: is tright here such an task as “conceptualanalysis” or have the right to thinkers perform no more than define usageand also, possibly, make references for readjust in usage? One’sanswer to this question will certainly determine whether one thinks thatWittgenstein was wrong to provide up on the principle of a methodical theoryof definition, and Quine ideal to indicate that the extremely idea of“meaning” was a hangover of Aristotelean essentialism. Ifthey were best, it is hard to hang on to the concept that“conceptual clarity” is a goal of philosophical inquiry… Metaphilosophical concerns float in the wings of the debates overwhether the content of an assertion varies from utterer to utterer andfrom audience to audience. If it does not, if somepoint remainsinvariable – the principles expressed by the words that consist of thesentence – then maybe tright here really are entities with intrinsicproperties which philosophical evaluation can hope to pin down. But, ifcontent does differ in this means, then principles are choose persons - neverfairly the exact same twice, always occurring, always maturing. You canreadjust a idea by transforming usage, yet you cannot get a conceptideal, once and also for all. (‘Analytic and ConversationalPhilosophy’, Philosophy as Cultural Politics,Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, 122-3)

Rosen, StanleyRusmarket, BertrandRyle, GilbertSchiller, FriedrichSellars, Wilfrid

analysis without synopsis need to be blind. (‘Time and the World Order’, in Herbert Feigl and Grover Maxwell, (eds.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science III, Minneapolis: College of Minnesota Press, 1962, 527)

Soames, ScottStebbing, L. SusanStrawson, Peter F.

An analysis, I mean, may be believed of as a type of breaking downor dewriting of somepoint. So we have actually the picture of a kind ofintellectual taking to pieces of ideas or concepts; the discovering ofwhat elements a concept or principle is created and also just how they areconnected. Is this the best image or the wrong one—or is itpartly appropriate and also partly wrong? That is a question which calls for ataken into consideration response … (Analysis and Metaphysics, Oxford:Oxford College Press, 1992, 2)

If we took this idea completelyseriously for the case of conceptual analysis—analysis ofideas—we need to conclude that our job was to find principles thatwere entirely straightforward, that were cost-free from inner conceptualcomplexity; and also then to demonstrate how the even more or much less complex ideasthat are of interemainder to thinkers might be assembled by a type oflogical or conceptual building and construction out of these easy facets. Theaim would certainly be to get a clear grasp of facility meanings by reducingthem, without remainder, to simple definitions. Hence baldly stated, thismight seem a rather implausible job. And so it is. However it,or some close relation of it, has actually been, and also is, taken seriously. Evenas soon as not taken to the lengths I have simply described, it continues toexercise a details influence on the philosophicalmind. (Ibid.

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Urmboy, J. O.Whitehead, Alfred North

The primary weapon is analysis. And analysis is the evocation of insight by the hypothetical suggestions of thought, and also the evocationof assumed by the tasks of direct understanding. In this procedure the compowebsite entirety, the interrelationships, and also the things associated, conpresently arise into clarity. (Esclaims in Science and Philosophy, New York: Philosophical Library, 1947, 157)

Wilchild, John Cook

Analysis is often understood to imply a whole of which the components areexplicitly known before the analysis; but logical aspects are for ourplain consciousness only implicit: we usage them without reflectingon them, just as we usage grammatical distinctions long prior to we haveany type of knowledge of grammar. Logic does not merely analyse: it makesexplicit what was implicit. (Statement and also Inference, Oxford:Oxford University Press, 1926, 49)

The theoretical process therefore combines in itself both theapproach of exploration and also the proof, and is the appropriate scientificexposition. The non-theoretical proof to which we are accustomed is atype of scientific pedanattempt, and it is consequently an excellent mistakeinitially to offer what is dubbed analysis, which synchronizes to thehypothetical procedure, and then to follow it by a synthesis, which isthe non-hypothetical component, hence placing aside analysis as if it were akind of accident. It is an error because it conceals the true processof thinking. (Ibid., 560)

Wittgenstein, Ludwig

A list of essential functions on analysis (monographs and also collections) deserve to be uncovered in the